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Abstract
In this paper we propose a formalization of probable innocence, a notion of probabilistic anonymity that is associated to “realistic”
protocols such as Crowds. We analyze critically two different deﬁnitions of probable innocence from the literature. The ﬁrst one,
corresponding to the property that Reiter and Rubin have proved for Crowds, aims at limiting the probability of detection. The
second one, by Halpern and O’Neill, aims at constraining the attacker’s conﬁdence. Our proposal combines the spirit of both these
deﬁnitions while generalizing them. In particular, our deﬁnition does not need symmetry assumptions, and it does not depend on the
probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest. We show that, in case of a symmetric system, our deﬁnition corresponds
exactly to the one of Reiter and Rubin. Furthermore, in the case of users with uniform probabilities, it amounts to a property similar
to that of Halpern and O’Neill.
Another contribution of our paper is the study of probable innocence in the case of protocol composition, namely when multiple
runs of the same protocol can be linked, as in the case of Crowds.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Often we wish to ensure that the identity of the user performing a certain action is maintained secret. This property is
called anonymity. Examples of situations in which we may wish to provide anonymity include: publishing on the web,
retrieving information from the web, sending a message, etc. Many protocols have been designed for this purpose, for
example, Crowds [15], Onion Routing [22], the Free Haven [7], Web MIX [1] and Freenet [4].
Most of the protocols providing anonymity use randommechanisms. Consequently, it is natural to think of anonymity
in probabilistic terms.Various notions of probabilistic anonymity have been proposed in literature, at different levels of
strength. The notion of anonymity in [3], called conditional anonymity in [9,10], and investigated also in [2], describes
the ideal situation in which the protocol does not leak any information concerning the identity of the user. This property
is satisﬁed for instance by the Dining Cryptographers with fair coins [3]. Protocols used in practice, however, especially
in presence of attackers or corrupted users, are only able to provide a weaker notion of anonymity.
In [15] Reiter and Rubin have proposed a hierarchy of notions of probabilistic anonymity in the context of Crowds.
We recall that Crowds is a system for anonymous web surﬁng aimed at protecting the identity of the users when
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sending (originating) messages. This is achieved by forwarding the message to another user selected randomly, which
in turn forwards the message, and so on, until the message reaches its destination. Part of the users may be corrupted
(attackers), and one of the main purposes of the protocol is to protect the identity of the originator of the message from
those attackers.
Quoting from [15], the hierarchy is described as follows. Here the sender stands for the user that forwards the
message to the attacker.
Beyond suspicion: From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the
message than any other potential sender in the system.
Probable innocence: From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the
message than to not be the originator.
Possible innocence: From the attacker’s point of view, there is a nontrivial probability that the real sender is someone
else.
In [15] the authors also considered a formal deﬁnition of probable innocence tailored to the characteristics of the
Crowds system, and proved it to hold for Crowds under certain conditions. Later Halpern and O’Neill proposed in [10]
a formal interpretation of the notions of the hierarchy above in more general terms. Their deﬁnitions are based on the
conﬁdence of the attacker. More precisely their deﬁnition of probable innocence holds if for the attacker, given the
events that he has observed, the probability that an user i has performed the action of interest is no more than 12 .
However, the property of probable innocence that Reiter andRubin express formally and prove for the systemCrowds
in [15] does not mention the user’s probability of being the originator, but only the probability of the event observed
by the attacker. More precisely, the property proved for Crowds is that the probability that the originator forwards
the message to an attacker (given that an attacker receives eventually the message) is at most 12 . In other words, their
deﬁnition expresses a limit on the probability of detection.
The property proved for Crowds in [15] depends only on the way the protocol works, and on the number of the
attackers. It is totally independent from the probability of each user to be the originator. This is of course a very desirable
property, since we do not want the correctness of a protocol to depend on the users’ intentions of originating a message.
For stronger notions of anonymity, this abstraction from the users’ probabilities 1 leads to the notion of probabilistic
anonymity deﬁned in [2], which is equivalent to the conditional anonymity deﬁned in [9,10]. Note that this deﬁnition is
different from the notion of strong probabilistic anonymity given in [9,10]: the latter depends, again, on the probabilities
of the users to perform the action of interest.
Another intended feature of our notion of probable innocence is the abstraction from the speciﬁc characteristics
of Crowds. In Crowds, there are certain symmetries that derive from the assumption that the probability that user i
forwards the message to user j is the same for all i and j. The property of probable innocence proved for Crowds in
[15] depends strongly on this assumption. We want a general notion that has the possibility to hold even in protocols
which do not satisfy the Crowds’ symmetries.
For completeness, we also consider the composition of protocols executions, with speciﬁc focus on the case that in
which the originator is the same and the protocol to be executed is the same. This situation can arise, for instance, when
an attacker can induce the originator to repeat the protocol (multiple paths attack). We extend the deﬁnition of probable
innocence to the case of protocol composition under the same originator, and we study how this property depends on
the number of compositions.
All the notions developed in this paper are deﬁned by using a model, for protocols and systems, based on a simpliﬁed
version of probabilistic automata [18]. Probabilistic Automata, and similar models like the concurrent Markov chains,
are now a mature ﬁeld of research with a solid theory and well established model checking tools like PRISM [13].
This opens the way to the automatic veriﬁcation of our notion of probable innocence. We refer to [5] for various
examples of veriﬁcation, using PRISM, of the related notion of weak anonymity developed within the same framework
of simpliﬁed probabilistic automata. Furthermore, we are currently developing a model checker for the probabilistic
-calculus [11,14]. This is a formalism whose semantics is again based on simpliﬁed probabilistic automata and it
is a natural language for expressing protocols running on distributed systems like Crowds. We aim in particular at
developing efﬁcient model checking techniques for computing the conditional probability of events, which constitute
the only kind of quantitative information needed for proving the formula expressing our notion of probable innocence.
1 For simplicity sometime we will refer to the users’ probability of performing the action of interest as “users’ probabilities”.
K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 123–138 125
1.1. Contribution
The main goal of this paper is to establish a general notion of probable innocence which combines the spirits of the
approaches discussed above, namely it expresses a limit both on the attacker’s conﬁdence and on the probability of
detection. Furthermore, we aim at a notion that does not depend on symmetry assumptions and on the probabilities of
the users to perform the action of interest.
We show that our deﬁnition, while being more general, corresponds exactly to the property that Reiter and Rubin
have proved for Crowds, under the speciﬁc symmetry conditions which are satisﬁed by Crowds. We also show that in
the particular case that the users have uniform probability of being the originator, we obtain a property similar to the
deﬁnition of probable innocence given by Halpern and O’Neill.
A second contribution is the analysis of the robustness of probable innocence under multiple paths attacks, which
induce a repetition of the protocol. We show a general negative result, namely that no protocol can ensure probable
innocence under an arbitrary number of repetitions, unless the system is strongly anonymous. This generalizes the
result, already known in literature, about the fact that Crowds cannot guarantee probable innocence under unbound
multiple path attacks.
1.2. Plan of the paper
In next section we recall some notions which are used in the rest of the paper: the probabilistic automata, the
framework for anonymity developed in [2], and the deﬁnition of (strong) probabilistic anonymity given in [2]. In
Section 3, we illustrate the Crowds protocol, we recall the property proved for Crowds and the deﬁnition of probable
innocence by Halpern and O’Neill, and we discuss them. In Section 4, we propose our notion of probable innocence
and we compare it with those of Section 3. In Section 5, we consider the repetition of an anonymity protocol and we
show that we cannot guarantee probable innocence for arbitrary repetition unless the protocol is strongly anonymous.
In Section 6, we discuss some related work from the literature. Section 7 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Probabilistic automata
In our approach we consider systems that can perform both probabilistic and nondeterministic choice. Intuitively, a
probabilistic choice represents a set of alternative transitions, each of them associated to a certain probability of being
selected. The sum of all probabilities on the alternatives of the choice must be 1, i.e. they form a probability distribution.
Nondeterministic choice is also a set of alternatives, butwe have no information on how likely one alternative is selected.
There have been many models proposed in literature that combine both nondeterministic and probabilistic choice.
One of the most general is the formalism of probabilistic automata proposed in [18]. In this work we use this formalism
to model anonymity protocols. We give here a brief description of it.
A probabilistic automaton consists in a set of states, and labeled transitions between them. For each node, the outgoing
transitions are partitioned in groups called steps. Each step represents a probabilistic choice, while the choice between
the steps is nondeterministic.
Fig. 1 illustrates some examples of probabilistic automata. We represent a step by putting an arc across the member
transitions. For instance, in (a), state s1 has two steps, the ﬁrst is a probabilistic choice between two transitions with
labels a and b, each with probability 12 . When there is only a transition in a step, like the one from state s3 to state s6,
the probability is of course 1 and we omit it.
In this paper, we use only a simpliﬁed kind of automaton, in which from each node we have either a probabilistic
choice or a nondeterministic choice (more precisely, either one step or a set of singleton steps), like in (b). In the
particular case that the choices are all probabilistic, like in (c), the automaton is called fully probabilistic.
Given an automaton M, we denote by etree(M) its unfolding, i.e. the tree of all possible executions of M (in Fig. 1
the automata coincide with their unfolding because there is no loop). If M is fully probabilistic, then each execution
(maximal branch) of etree(M) has a probability obtained as the product of the probability of the edges along the branch.
In the ﬁnite case, we can deﬁne a probability measure for each set of executions, called event, by summing up the
126 K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 123–138
s2
s1 s1 s1
1/2
a
bc
1/2 1/2
1/3
2/3
c
c
b a
1/2
s3
s6
s5
s4
s8
s7
(a)
a
b
c
a
a
a
b
c
c
1/2 1/2 1/21/2
1/2
1/3
1/6
(b) (c)
c
Fig. 1. Examples of probabilistic automata.
probabilities of the elements. 2 Given an event x, we will denote by p(x) the probability of x. For instance, let the event
c be the set of all computations in which c occurs. In (c) its probability is p(c) = 13 × 12 + 16 = 13 .
When nondeterminism is present, the probability can vary, depending on how we resolve the nondeterminism.
In other words we need to consider a function  that, each time there is a choice between different steps, selects one
of them. By pruning the nonselected steps, we obtain a fully probabilistic execution tree etree(M, ) on which we can
deﬁne the probability as before. For historical reasons (i.e. since nondeterminism typically arises from the parallel
operator), the function  is called scheduler.
It should then be clear that the probability of an event is relative to the particular scheduler.Wewill denote byp(x) the
probability of the event x under the scheduler . For example, consider (a).We have two possible schedulers determined
by the choice of the step in s1. Under one scheduler, the probability of c is 12 . Under the other, it is
2
3 × 12 + 13 = 23 .
In (b) we have three possible schedulers under which the probability of c is 0, 12 and 1, respectively.
2.2. Anonymity systems
The concept of anonymity is relative to the set of anonymous users and to what is visible to the observer. Hence,
following [17,16] we classify the actions of the automaton into the three sets A,B and C as follows:
• A is the set of the anonymous actions A = {a(i) | i ∈ I } where I is the set of the identities of the anonymous users
and a is an injective function from I to the set of actions, which we call abstract action. We also call the pair (I, a)
anonymous action generator.
• B is the set of the observable actions. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements of this set.
• C is the set of the remaining actions (which are unobservable).
Note that the actions in A normally are not visible to the observer, or at least, not for the part that depends on the identity
i. However, for the purpose of deﬁning and verifying anonymity we model the elements of A as visible outcomes of
the system.
Deﬁnition 1. An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a, B,Z, p), where M is a probabilistic automaton, (I, a) is an
anonymous action generator, B is a set of observable actions, Z is the set of all possible schedulers for M, and for every
 ∈ Z , p is the probability measure on the event space generated by etree(M, ).
For simplicity, we assume the users to be the only possible source of nondeterminism in the system. If they are
probabilistic, then the system is fully probabilistic, hence Z is a singleton and we omit it.
We introduce the following notation to represent the events of interest:
• a(i): all the executions in etree(M, ) containing the action a(i);
• a: all the executions in etree(M, ) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i;
• o: all the executions in etree(M, ) containing the sequence of observable actions o (where o is of the form
b1b2 . . . bn for some b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈ B). We denote by O (observables) the set of all o’s of interest.
2 In the inﬁnite case things are more complicated: we cannot deﬁne a probability measure for all sets of execution, and we need to consider as
event space the -ﬁeld generated by the cones of etree(M). However, in this paper, we consider only the ﬁnite case.
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We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the complement of events,
respectively.
We wish to keep the notion of observables as general as possible, but we still need to make some assumptions on
them. First, we want the observables to be execution-disjoint events, in the sense that no execution can contain both o1
and o2 if o1 = o2. Second, they must cover all possible outcomes. Third, an observable o must indicate unambiguously
whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either implies a, or it implies ¬a. In set-theoretic terms it means that either o is
a subset of a or of the complement of a. Formally 3 :
Assumption 1 (On the observables). (1) ∀ ∈ Z. ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 = o2 ⇒ p(o1 ∪ o2) = p(o1) + p(o2).
(2) ∀ ∈ Z. p(O) = 1.
(3) ∀ ∈ Z. ∀o ∈ O. (p(o ∩ a) = p(o)) ∨ p(o ∩ ¬a) = p(o).
Analogously, we need to make some assumption on the anonymous actions. We consider ﬁrst the conditions tailored
for the nondeterministic users: each scheduler determines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place
or not, and in the positive case, there is only one such i. Formally:
Assumption 2 (On the anonymous actions, for nondeterministic users). ∀ ∈ Z. p(a) = 0 ∨ (∃i ∈ I. (p(a(i)) =
1 ∧ ∀j ∈ I. j = i ⇒ p(a(j)) = 0)).
We now consider the case in which the users are fully probabilistic. The assumption on the anonymous actions in
this case is much weaker: we only require that there be at most one user that performs a, i.e. a(i) and a(j) must be
disjoint for i = j . Formally:
Assumption 3 (On the anonymous actions, for probabilistic users). ∀i, j ∈ I. i = j ⇒ p(a(i)∪a(j)) = p(a(i))+
p(a(j)).
2.3. Strong probabilistic anonymity
In this section we recall the notion of strong anonymity proposed in [2].
Let us ﬁrst assume that the users are nondeterministic. Intuitively, a system is strongly anonymous if, given two
schedulers  and ϑ that both choose a (say a(i) and a(j), respectively), it is not possible to detect from the probabilistic
measure of the observables whether the scheduler has been  or ϑ (i.e. whether the selected user was i or j).
Note that  chooses a if and only if p(a) = 1 or, equivalently, if and only if p(a(i)) = 1 for some i.
Deﬁnition 2. A system (M, I, a, B,Z, p) with nondeterministic users is anonymous if
∀,ϑ ∈ Z. ∀o ∈ O. p(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ p(o) = pϑ(o).
The probabilistic counterpart of Deﬁnition 2 can be formalized using the concept of conditional probability. Recall
that, given two events x and y with p(y) > 0, the conditional probability of x given y, denoted by p(x | y), is equal to
p(x ∩ y)/p(y).
Deﬁnition 3. A system (M, I, a, B, p) with probabilistic users is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)).
The notions of anonymity illustrated so far focus on the probability of the observables. More precisely, it requires the
probability of the observables to be independent from the selected user. In [2] it was shown that Deﬁnition 3 is equivalent
to the notion adopted implicitly in [3], and called conditional anonymity in [9]. As illustrated in the Introduction, the
3 Note that the intuitive explanations here are stronger than the corresponding formal assumptions because, in the inﬁnite case, there could be
nontrivial sets of measure 0. However in the case of anonymity we usually deal with ﬁnite scenarios. In any case, these formal assumptions are
enough for ensuring the properties of the anonymity notions that we need in this paper.
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idea of this notion is that a system is anonymous if the observations do not change the probability of the a(i)’s. In other
words, we may know the probability of a(i) by some means external to the system, but the system should not increase
our knowledge about it.
Proposition 4 (Bhargava and Palamidessi [2]). A system (M, I, a, B, p) with probabilistic users is anonymous iff
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | a).
Note 1. To be precise, the probabilistic counterpart of Deﬁnition 2 should be stronger than that given in Deﬁnition 3,
in fact it should be independent from the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest, like Deﬁnition 2 is.
We could achieve this by assuming the system to be parametric with respect to the probability distribution of the users,
and then require the formula to hold for every possible distribution. Proposition 4 should be modiﬁed accordingly.
Note 2. The large number of anonymity deﬁnitions often leads to confusion. In the rest of the paper we will refer to
Deﬁnition 3 as (strong) probabilistic anonymity. By conditional anonymity we will refer to the condition in Proposition
4 which corresponds to the deﬁnition of Halpern and O’Neill [9]. Finally by strong anonymity we will refer to the
corresponding deﬁnition in [9] which can be expressed as
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O : p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o). (1)
3. Probable innocence
Strong and conditional anonymity are notions which are usually difﬁcult to achieve in practice. For instance, in the
case of protocols like Crowds, the originator needs to take some initiative, thus revealing himself to the attacker with
greater probability than the rest of the users.As a result, more relaxed levels of anonymity, such as probable innocence,
are provided by real protocols.
Probable innocence is verbally deﬁned by Reiter and Rubin [15] as “the sender (the user who forwards the message
to the attacker) appears no more likely to be the originator than not to be the originator”. Two different approaches to
formalize this notion exist. The ﬁrst focuses on the probability of the observables and constraints the probability of
detecting a user. The second focuses on the probability of the users and constraints the attacker’s conﬁdence that the
detected user is the originator.
In this section we ﬁrst present the Crowds protocol. Then we discuss the two existing deﬁnitions in literature,
corresponding to the approaches above, and we argue that each of them has some shortcoming: the ﬁrst does not seem
satisfactory when the system is not symmetric. The second depends on the users (their probability to perform the action)
while, intuitively, anonymity should be a property of the protocol only. In Section 4 we will present a new deﬁnition
which combines the spirit of the existing ones, and that at the same time overcomes the above shortcomings.
3.1. The Crowds protocol
This protocol, presented in [15], allows Internet users to perform web transactions without revealing their identity.
The idea is to randomly route the request through a crowd of users. Thus when the web server receives the request he
does not know who is the originator since the user who sent the request to the server is simply forwarding it. The more
interesting case, however, is when an attacker is a member of the crowd and participates in the protocol. In this case the
originator is exposed with higher probability than any other user and strong anonymity cannot be achieved. However,
it can be proved that Crowds provides probable innocence under certain conditions.
More speciﬁcally a crowd is a group of m users who participate in the protocol. Some of the users may be corrupted
which means they can collaborate in order to reveal the identity of the originator. Let c be the number of such users
and pf a parameter of the protocol, explained below. When a user, called the initiator or originator, wants to request a
web page he must create a path between him and the server. This is achieved by the following process:
• The initiator selects randomly a member of the crowd (possibly himself) and forwards the request to him. We will
refer to this latter user as the forwarder.
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• A forwarder, upon receiving a request, ﬂips a biased coin. With probability 1 − pf he delivers the request directly
to the server. With probability pf he selects randomly, with uniform probability, a new forwarder (possibly himself)
and forwards the request to him. The new forwarder repeats the same procedure.
The response from the server follows the same route in the opposite direction to return to the initiator. It must be
mentioned that all communication in the path is encrypted using a path key, mainly to defend against local eavesdroppers
(see [15] for more details). In this paper we are interested in attacks performed by corrupted members of the crowd to
reveal the initiator’s identity. Each member is considered to have only access to the trafﬁc routed through him, so he
cannot intercept messages addressed to other members.
3.2. Deﬁnition of probable innocence
3.2.1. First approach (limit on the probability of detection)
Reiter andRubin [15] give a deﬁnitionwhich considers the probability of the originator being observed by a corrupted
member, that is being directly before him in the path. Let I denote the event “the originator is observed by a corrupted
member” and H1+ the event “at least one corrupted member appears in the path”. Then probable innocence can be
deﬁned as
p(I |H1+) 12 . (2)
In [15] it is proved that this property is satisﬁed by Crowds if npf/(pf − 12 )(c + 1).
For simplicity, we suppose that a corrupted user will not forward a request to other crowd members, so at most one
user can be observed. This approach is also followed in [15,20,24] and the reason is that by forwarding the request the
corrupted users cannot gain any new information since forwarders are chosen randomly.
We now express the above deﬁnition in the framework of this paper (Section 2.2). Since I ⇒ H1+ we have
p(I |H1+) = p(I)/p(H1+). If Ai denotes that “user i is the originator” and Di is the event “the user i was observed
by a corrupted member (appears in the path right before the corrupter member)” then p(I) = ∑ip(Di ∧ Ai) =∑
ip(Di |Ai)p(Ai). Since p(Di |Ai) is the same for all i then deﬁnition (2) can be written as ∀i : p(Di |Ai)
/P (H1+) 12 .
Let A be the set of all crowd members and O = {oi | i ∈ A} the set of observables. Essentially a(i) denotes Ai and
oi denotes Di . Note that Di is an observable since it can be observed by a corrupted user (remember that corrupted
users share their information). Also let h =∨i∈A oi , meaning that some user was observed. Deﬁnition (2) can now be
written as
∀i ∈ A : p(oi | a(i)) 12 p(h). (3)
This is indeed an intuitive deﬁnition for Crowds. However, there are many questions raised by this approach. For
example, we are only interested in the probability of one speciﬁc event, what about other events that might reveal
the identity of the initiator? For example the event ¬oi will have probability greater than p(h)/2, is this important?
Moreover, consider the case where the probability of oi under a different initiator j is negligible. Then, if we observe
oi , isn’t it more probable that user i sent the message, even if p(oi | a(i)) is less than p(h)/2?
If we consider arbitrary protocols, then there are cases where condition (3) does not express the expected properties
of probable innocence. We give two examples of such systems in Fig. 2 and we explain them below.
Example 5. On the left-hand side of Fig. 2, m users are participating in a Crowds-like protocol. The only difference,
with respect to the standardCrowds, is that user 1 is behind aﬁrewall,whichmeans that he can sendmessages to any other
user but he cannot receive messages from any of them. In the corresponding table we give the conditional probabilities
p(oj | a(i)), where we recall that oj means that j is the user who sends the message to the corrupted member, and a(i)
means that i is the initiator. When user 1 is the initiator the probability of observing him is c/(m − pf) (there is a c/m
chance that user 1 sends the message to a corrupted user and there is also a chance that he forwards it to himself and
sends it to a corrupted user in the next round). All other users can be observed with the same probability l. When any
other user is the initiator, however, the probability of observing user 1 is 0, since he will never receive the message.
In fact, the protocol will behave exactly like a Crowd of m − 1 users as it is shown in the table.
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Fig. 2. Examples of arbitrary (nonsymmetric) protocols. The value at position i, j represents p(oj | a(i)) for user i and observable oj .
Note that Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition (3) requires the diagonal of this table to be less than p(h)/2. In this example
the deﬁnition holds provided that m − 1pf/(pf − 1/2)(c + 1). In fact, for all users i = 1, p(oi | a(i)) is the same
as in the original Crowds (which satisﬁes the deﬁnition) and for user 1 it is even smaller. However, If a corrupted
member observes user 1 he can be sure that he is the initiator since no other initiator leads to the observation of user 1.
The problem here is that Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition constraints only the probability of detection of user 1 and says
nothing about the attacker’s conﬁdence in case of detection.We believe that totally revealing the identity of the initiator
with nonnegligible probability is undesirable and should be considered as a violation of an anonymity notion such as
probable innocence.
Example 6. On the right-hand side we have an opposite counter-example. Three users want to communicate with a
web server, but they can only access it through a proxy. We suppose that all users are honest but they do not trust the
proxy so they do not want to reveal their identity to him. So they use the following protocol: the initiator ﬁrst forwards
the message to one of the users 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 23 ,
1
6 and
1
6 , respectively, regardless of which is the initiator.
The user who receives the message forwards it to the proxy. The probabilities of observing each user are shown in the
corresponding table. Regardless of which is the initiator, user 1 will be observed with probability 23 and the others with
probability 16 each.
In this example Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition does not hold since p(o1 | a(1)) > 12 . However, all users produce the
same observables with the same probabilities hence we cannot distinguish between them. Indeed the system is strongly
anonymous (Deﬁnition 3 holds)! Thus, in the general case, we cannot adopt (3) as the deﬁnition of probable innocence
since we want such a notion to be implied by strong anonymity.
However, it should be noted that in the case of Crowds the deﬁnition of Reiter and Rubin is correct, because of a
special symmetry property of the protocol. This is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.
Finally, note that the above deﬁnition does not mention the probability of the users to be the originator. It only
considers such events as conditions in the conditional probability of the event oi given that i is the originator. The value
of such conditional probability does not imply anything for the user, he might have a very small or very big probability
of initiating the message. This is a major difference with respect to the next approach.
3.2.2. Second approach (limit on the attacker’s conﬁdence)
Halpern and O’Neill propose in [9] a general framework for deﬁning anonymity properties. We give a very abstract
idea of this framework, detailed information is available in [9]. In this framework a system consists of a group of agents,
K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 123–138 131
each having a local state at each point of the execution. The local state contains all information that the user may have
and does not need to be explicitly deﬁned. At each point (r,m) user i can only have access to his local state ri(m). So
he does not know the actual point (r,m) but at least he knows that it must be a point (r ′,m′) such that r ′i (m′) = ri(m).
Let Ki(r,m) be the set of all these points. If a formula  is true in all points of Ki(r,m) then we say that i knows .
In the probabilistic setting it is possible to create a measure on Ki(r,m) and draw conclusions of the form “formula 
is true with probability p”.
To deﬁne probable innocence Halpern and O’Neill ﬁrst deﬁne a formula (i, a) meaning “user i performed the event
a”. We then say that a system has probable innocence if for all points (r,m), the probability of (i, a) in this point for
all users j (that is, the probability that arises by measuring Kj(r,m)) is less that one half.
This deﬁnition can be expressed in the framework of Section 2.2. The probability of a formula for user j at the point
(r,m) depends only on the set Kj(r,m) which itself depends only on rj (m). The latter is the local state of the user,
that is the only things that he can observe. In our framework this corresponds to the observables of the probabilistic
automaton. Thus, we can reformulate the deﬁnition of Halpern and O’Neill as
∀i ∈ I,∀o ∈ O : p(a(i) | o) 12 . (4)
This deﬁnition is similar to the one ofReiter andRubin but not the same.The difference is that it considers the probability
that, given a certain observation, the user has performed the action of interest, not the opposite. If this probability is
less that one half then intuitively i appear less likely to have performed o than not to.
The problem with this deﬁnition is that the probabilities of the users are not part of the system and we can make no
assumptions about them. Consider for example the case where we know that user i visits very often a speciﬁc web site,
so even if we have 100 users, the probability that he performed a request to this site is 0.99. Then we cannot expect this
probability to become less than one half under all observations. A similar remark about strong anonymity led Halpern
and O’Neill to deﬁne conditional anonymity. If a user i has higher probability of performing the action than user j then
we cannot expect this to change because of the system. Instead we can request that the system does not provide any
new information about the originator of the action.
4. A new deﬁnition of probable innocence
In this section we give a new deﬁnition of probable innocence that combines the spirit of the two existing ones.
The spirit of Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition is to constraint the probability of detection of a user, which is captured in our
Deﬁnition 8. The spirit of Halpern and O’Neill’s deﬁnition is to constrain the attacker’s conﬁdence, which is captured
in our Deﬁnition 7. The new deﬁnition combines both spirits in the sense that Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 are equivalent.
Moreover, it overcomes the shortcomings discussed in previous section, namely, it does not depend on the symmetry
of the system and it does not depend on the users’ probabilities. We also show that our deﬁnition is a generalization of
the existing ones since it can be reduced to them under the assumption of symmetry for the ﬁrst, and of uniform users’
probability for the second.
One of the goals of the new deﬁnition is to abstract from the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest.
These probabilities, although they affect the probability measure p of the anonymity system, are not part of the protocol
and can vary in different executions. To model this fact, let u be a probability measure on the set I of anonymous users.
Then, we suppose that the anonymity system is equipped with a probability measure pu, which depends on u, satisfying
the following conditions:
pu(a(i)) = u(i), (5)
pu(o | a(i)) = pu′(o | a(i)) (6)
for all users i, observables o and user distributions u, u′ such that u(i) > 0, u′(i) > 0. Condition (5) requires that the
selection of user is made using the distribution u. Condition (6) requires that, having selected a user, the distribution
u does not affect the probability of any observable o. In other words u is used to select a user and only for that. This
is typical in anonymity protocols where a user is selected in the beginning (this models the user’s decision to send a
message) and then some observables are produced that depend on the selected user. We will denote by p(o | a(i)) the
probability pu(o | a(i)) under some u such that u(i) > 0.
In general we would like our anonymity deﬁnitions to range over all possible values of u since we cannot as-
sume anything about the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest. Thus, Halpern and O’Neill’s
132 K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 123–138
deﬁnition (4) should be written: ∀u∀i∀o : pu(a(i) | o) 12 which makes even more clear the fact that it cannot hold for
all u, for example if we take u(i) to be very close to 1. On the other hand, Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition contains only
probabilities of the form p(o | a(i)). Crowds satisﬁes condition (6) so these probabilities are independent from u.
In [9], where they deﬁne conditional anonymity, Halpern and O’Neill make the following remark about strong
anonymity. Since the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest are generally unknown we cannot
expect that all users appear with the same probability. All that we can ensure is that the system does not reveal any
information, that is that the probability of every user before and after making an observation should be the same. In
other words, the fraction between the probabilities of any couple of users should not be one, but should at least remain
the same before and after the observation.
We apply the same idea to probable innocence. We start by rewriting relation (4) as
∀i ∈ A,∀o ∈ O : 1 pu(a(i) | o)
pu(
∨
j =i a(j) | o)
. (7)
As we already explained, if u(i) is very high then we cannot expect this fraction to be less than 1. Instead, we could
require that it does not surpass the corresponding fraction of the probabilities before the execution of the protocol. So
we generalize condition (7) in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7. A system (M, I, a, B, pu) has probable innocence if for all user distributions u, users i ∈ I and observ-
ables o ∈ O, the following holds:
(n − 1) pu(a(i))
pu(
∨
j =i a(j))
 pu(a(i) | o)
pu(
∨
j =i a(j) | o)
,
where n = |I | is the number of anonymous users.
In probable innocence we consider the probability of a user to perform the action of interest compared to the
probability of all the other users together. Deﬁnition 7 requires that the fraction of these probabilities after the execution
of the protocol should be no bigger than n − 1 times the same fraction before the execution. The n − 1 factor comes
from the fact that in probable innocence some information about the sender’s identity is leaked. For example, if users
are uniformly distributed, each of them has probability 1/n before the protocol and the sender could appear with
probability 12 afterwards. In this case, the fraction between the sender and all other users is 1/(n − 1) before the
protocol and becomes 1 after. Deﬁnition 7 states that this fraction can be increased, thus leaking some information,
but no more than n − 1 times.
Deﬁnition 7 generalizes relation (4) and can be applied in cases where the distribution of users is not uniform.
However, it still involves the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest, which are not a part of the
system. What we would like is a deﬁnition similar to Deﬁnition 3 which involves only probabilities of events that are
part of the system. To achieve this we rewrite Deﬁnition 7 using the following transformations. For all users we assume
that u(i) > 0. Users with zero probability to perform the action could be removed from Deﬁnition 7 before proceeding.
(n − 1) pu(a(i))∑
j =i pu(a(j))
 pu(a(i) | o)∑
j =i pu(a(j) | o)
⇔ (n − 1) pu(a(i))∑
j =i pu(a(j))
 pu(o | a(i))pu(a(i))/pu(o)∑
j =i pu(o | a(j))pu(a(j))/pu(o)
⇔ (n − 1)∑
j =i
pu(o | a(j))pu(a(j))  pu(o | a(i))∑
j =i
pu(a(j)).
We obtain a lower bound of the left clause by replacing all pu(o | a(j)) with their minimum. So we require that
(n − 1)min
j =i {pu(o | a(j))}
∑
j =i
pu(a(j))  pu(o | a(i))∑
j =i
pu(a(j)) (8)
⇔ (n − 1)min
j =i pu(o | a(j))  pu(o | a(i)). (9)
Condition (9) can be interpreted as follows: for each observable, the probability that user i performs the action should
be balanced by the corresponding probabilities of the other users. It would be more natural to have the sum of all
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pu(o | a(j)) at the left side, in fact the left side of (9) is a lower bound of this sum. However, since the probabilities
of the users are unknown, we have to consider the “worst” case where the user with the minimum pu(o | a(j)) has the
greatest probability of appearing.
Finally, condition (9) is equivalent to the following deﬁnition that we propose as a general deﬁnition of probable
innocence.
Deﬁnition 8. Asystem (M, I, a, B, pu) has probable innocence if for all observables o ∈ O and for all users i, j ∈ I 4 :
(n − 1)p(o | a(j))p(o | a(i)).
The meaning of this deﬁnition is that in order for pu(a(i))/pu(
∨
j =i a(j)) to increase at most by n − 1 times
(Deﬁnition 7), the corresponding fraction between the probabilities of the observables must be at most n− 1. Note that
in probabilistic anonymity (Deﬁnition 3) p(o | a(i)) and p(o | a(j)) are required to be equal. In probable innocence we
allow p(o | a(i)) to be bigger, thus losing some anonymity, but no more than n − 1 times.
Deﬁnition8has the advantageof includingonly theprobabilities of the observables andnot those of the users, similarly
to Deﬁnition 3 of probabilistic anonymity. It is clear that Deﬁnition 8 implies Deﬁnition 7 since we strengthened the
ﬁrst to obtain the second. Since Deﬁnition 7 considers all possible distributions of the users, the inverse implication
also holds.
Proposition 9. Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 are equivalent.
Proof. Deﬁnition 8 ⇒ Deﬁnition 7 is trivial, since we strengthen the second to obtain the ﬁrst. For the inverse suppose
that Deﬁnition 7 holds but Deﬁnition 8 does not, so there exist users k, l and observable o such that (n−1)pu(o | a(k)) <
pu(o | a(l)). Thus there exist an  > 0 s.t.
(n − 1)(pu(o | a(k)) + )pu(o | a(l)). (10)
Deﬁnition 7 should hold for all user distributions u so we select one which assigns a very small probability  to all
users except k, l. That is u(i) = /(n − 2)∀i = k, l. From Deﬁnition 7 (for i = k) we have:
(n − 1)(pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k)) + ∑
j =k,l
pu(o | a(j)))pu(o | a(l))( + pu(a(k)) (11)
pu(o | a(j))1⇒ (n − 1)(pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k)) + )pu(o | a(l))( + pu(a(k))
(10)⇒ pu(a(k))pu(o | a(k))+(pu(o | a(k))+)(+pu(a(k)) ⇒ (1−pu(o | a(k)) − )pu(a(k))
(10)⇒  pu(a(k))
1 − pu(o | a(l))/(n − 1) . (12)
If n > 2 then the right side of inequality 12 is strictly positive so it is sufﬁcient to take a smaller  and end up with a
contradiction. If n = 2 then there are no other users except k, l and we can proceed similarly. 
Example 10. Recall now the two examples of Fig. 2. If we apply Deﬁnition 8 to the ﬁrst one we see that it does not hold
since (n − 1)p(o1 | a(2)) = 0c/(n − pf) = p(o1 | a(1)). This agree with our intuition of probable innocence being
violated when user 1 is observed. In the second example the deﬁnition holds since ∀i, j : p(oi | a(i)) = p(oj | a(j)).
Thus, we see that in these two examples our deﬁnition reﬂects correctly the notion of probable innocence.
4.1. Relation to other deﬁnitions
4.1.1. Deﬁnition by Reiter and Rubin
Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition can be expressed by condition (3). It considers the probabilities of the observables
(not the users) and it requires that for any user which originates the message, a special observable, representing the
4 Remember that pu(o | a(i)) is independent from u so we can take any distribution such that u(i) > 0, for example a uniform one.
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detection of the user by a corrupted member, has probability less than p(h)/2. As we saw at the examples of Fig. 2
what is important is not the actual probability of an observable when a speciﬁc user is the originator, but its relation
with the corresponding probabilities when the other users are the originators.
However, in Crowds there are some important symmetries. First of all the number of the observables is the same as
the number of users. For each user i there is an observable oi meaning that the user i is observed. When i is the initiator,
oi has clearly a higher probability than the other observables. However, since forwarders are randomly selected, the
probability of oj is the same for all j = i. The same holds for the observables. oi is more likely to have been performed
by i. However all other users j = i have the same probability of producing it. These symmetries can be expressed as
∀i ∈ I,∀k, l = i : p(ok | a(i)) = p(ol | a(i)), (13)
p(oi | a(k)) = p(oi | a(l)). (14)
Because of these symmetries, we cannot have a situation similar to the ones of Fig. 2. On the left-hand side, for
example, the probability p(o1 | a(2)) = 0 should be the same as p(o3 | a(2)). To keep the value 0 (which is the
reason why probable innocence is not satisﬁed) we should have 0 everywhere in the row (except p(o2 | a(2))) which
is impossible since the sum of the row should be p(h) and p(o2 | a(2))p(h)/2.
So the reason why probable innocence is satisﬁed in Crowds is not the fact that observing the initiator has low
probability (what deﬁnition (2) ensures) by itself, but the fact that deﬁnition (2), because of the symmetry, forces the
probability of observing any of the other users to be high enough.
Note that the number of anonymous users n is not the same as the number of users m in Crowds, in fact n = m − c
where c is the number of corrupted users.
Proposition 11. Under the symmetry requirements (13) and (14), Deﬁnition 8 is equivalent to the one of Reiter and
Rubin.
Proof. Due to the symmetry it is easy to see that there are only two possible values for p(oi | a(j)). Namely when i
is the sender, the probability to observe i is the same for all i. Similarly the probability of observing a different user
j = i is the same for all j. So
p(oi | a(j)) =
{
 if i = j,
 if i = j.
Note that  + (n − 1) = p(h). So Deﬁnition 8 for oi becomes
p(oi | a(i))  (n − 1)p(oi | a(j))
⇒ (n − 1)
⇒ p(h) − 
⇒ p(oi | a(i)) 12p(h)
which corresponds to Reiter and Rubin’s deﬁnition. 
4.1.2. Deﬁnition of Halpern and O’Neill
One of the motivations behind the new deﬁnition of probable innocence is that it should make no assumptions about
the probabilities of the users. If we assume a uniform distribution of users then it can be shown that our deﬁnition
becomes the same as the one of Halpern and O’Neill.
Proposition 12. The deﬁnition of Halpern and O’Neill can be obtained by Deﬁnition 7 if we consider a uniform
distribution of users, that is a distribution u such that ∀i, j ∈ I : u(i) = u(j) = 1/n.
Proof. Trivial. Since all users have the same probability then ∀i ∈ I : p(a(i)) = 1/n and the left side of Deﬁnition 7
is equal to 1. 
Note that the equivalence of Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 is based on the fact that the former ranges over all possible
distributions u. Thus Deﬁnition 8 is strictly stronger than the one of Halpern and O’Neill.
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Fig. 3. Relation between the various anonymity deﬁnitions.
4.1.3. Probabilistic anonymity
It is easy to see that strong anonymity (Eq. (1)) implies Halpern and O’Neill’s deﬁnition of probable innocence.
Deﬁnition 8 preserves the same implication in the case of probabilistic anonymity.
Proposition 13. Probabilistic anonymity implies probable innocence (Deﬁnition 8).
Proof. Trivial. If Deﬁnition 3 holds then p(o | a(j)) = p(o | a(i))∀o, i, j . 
The relation between the various deﬁnitions of anonymity is summarized in Fig. 3. The classiﬁcation in columns is
based on the type of probabilities that are considered. The ﬁrst column considers the probability of different users, the
second the probability of the same user before and after an observation and the third the probability of the observables.
Concerning the lines, the ﬁrst corresponds to the strong case and the second to probable innocence. It is clear from the
table that the new deﬁnition is to probable innocence as conditional anonymity is to strong anonymity.
5. Protocol composition
In protocol analysis, it is often easier to split complex protocols in parts, analyze each part separately and then
combine the results. In this section we will consider the case where a protocol is “repeated” multiple times but with
only one user-selection phase in the beginning. This situation arises when an attacker can force a user to repeat the
protocol many times. We will examine the anonymity guarantees of the resulting protocol with respect to the existing
one, obtaining a general result for a class of attacks that appear in protocols such as Crowds.
First, we deﬁne the “sequential composition” of two anonymity systems.
Deﬁnition 14. Let A1 = (M1, I, a1, B1, p1), A2 = (M2, I, a2, B2, p2) be two anonymity systems with the same
set of anonymous users I. The sequential composition of A1 and A2, denoted as A1;A2 is an anonymity system
(M, I, a, B, p) such that:
exec(M) ⊆ exec(M1) × exec(M2), (15)
a−11 (	1) = a−12 (	2) ∀	1	2 ∈ exec(M), (16)
p(o1o2 | a(i)) = p1(o1 | a(i)) · p2(o2 | a(i)) ∀o1o2 ∈ O1 × O2, (17)
where exec(M) is the set of all executions in etree(M), a−1i is the inverse function of ai and Oi is the set of observables
of Ai .
Intuitively, A1;A2 emulates A1 in the beginning. When A1 terminates then it emulates A2 but without re-selecting
a user, keeping the same user that was selected in A1. So the executions of A1;A2 are of the form 	1	2, where 	i is an
execution of Ai , with the constraint that 	1, 	2 should correspond to the same user. Since the user is selected once, the
probability of the event o1o2 given a user i is the product of the corresponding probabilities of each system. We are not
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interested in the exact structure of the automaton M, however, it should be relatively simple to construct it from M1
and M2.
Repetition is a special case of sequential composition when the two systems are the same.
Deﬁnition 15. Let A be an anonymity system. We deﬁne the m-repetition of A as Am = A; . . . ;A,m times.
Let A be an anonymity system and O its set of observables. We will examine the anonymity guarantees of Am with
respect to the ones of A. From Deﬁnition 3 and Eq. (17) it is easy to conclude that Am is strongly anonymous if and
only if A is strongly anonymous too, which is expected since the probability of each single event is the same under any
user. However, the case of probable innocence is more interesting since an event might have greater probability under
user i that under user j.
Consider a systemwith three users, andone eventowithprobabilitiesp(o | a(1)) = 12 andp(o | a(2)) = p(o | a(3)) =
1
4 . This system satisﬁes Deﬁnition 8 thus it provides probable innocence. If we repeat the protocol two times then the
probabilities for the event oo will be p(oo | a(1)) = 14 and p(oo | a(2)) = p(oo | a(3)) = 116 , but now Deﬁnition 8
is violated. In the original protocol the probability of o under user 1 was two times bigger than the corresponding
probability of the other users, but after the repetition it became four times bigger and Deﬁnition 8 does not allow it.
In the general case, the system Am satisﬁes (by deﬁnition) probable innocence if
(n − 1)p(o1 . . . om | a(i))p(o1 . . . om | a(j)) ∀o1, . . . , om ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I. (18)
The following lemma states that it is sufﬁcient to check only the events of the form o . . . o (the same event repeated m
times), and expresses the probable innocence of Am using probabilities of A.
Lemma 16. Let A = (M, I, a, B, p) be an anonymity system, n = |I | and O its set of observable events. Am satisﬁes
probable innocence if and only if:
(n − 1)pm(o | a(i))pm(o | a(j)) ∀o ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I. (19)
Proof (Only if). We can use Eq. (18) with o1 = · · · = om = o and then (17) to obtain (19). (If) We can write (19) as
m
√
n − 1p(o | a(i))p(o | a(j)). Let o1, . . . , om be events, by applying this inequality to all of them we have:
m
√
n − 1p(o1 | a(i))  p(o1 | a(j))
...
m
√
n − 1p(om | a(i))  p(om | a(j)).
Then by multiplying these inequalities we obtain (18). 
Lemma 16 explains our previous example. The probability p(o | a(2)) = 14 was smaller than p(o | a(1)) = 12 but
sufﬁcient to provide probable innocence. But when we raised these probabilities to the power of two, 116 was too small
so the event oo would expose user 1. In fact, if we allow an arbitrary number of repetitions Eq. (19) can never hold,
unless the probability of all events under any user is the same, that is if the system is strongly anonymous.
Proposition 17. Let A be an anonymity system. Am satisﬁes probable innocence for all m if and only if A is strongly
anonymous.
Proof. We rewrite Eq. (19) as 5
n − 1
(
p(o | a(j))
p(o | a(i))
)m
∀o ∈ O, ∀i, j ∈ I. (20)
If A is strongly anonymous then by Deﬁnition 3: p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)) for all o, i, j so the right side of inequality
(20) is 1 thus it always holds (for n2). Otherwise there exist o, i, j such that p(o | a(j)) > p(o | a(i)). So (20) cannot
hold for all m since 
m → ∞ when m → ∞ for 
 > 1. 
5 Note that in order to have probable innocence (or strong anonymity) p(o | a(i)) should be nonzero for all o and i except from trivial systems
where all observables have zero probabilities. Thus, we consider only non zero values for p(o | a(i)).
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5.1. Multiple paths attack
As stated in the original paper of Crowds, after creating a random path to a server, a user should use the same path for
all the future requests to the same server. However there is a chance that some node in the path leaves the network, in
that case the user has to create a new path using the same procedure. In theory the two paths cannot be linked together,
that is the attacker cannot know that it is the same user who created the two paths. In practice, however, such a link
could be achieved by means unrelated to the protocol such as the url of the server, the data of the request etc. By linking
the two requests the attacker obtains more observables that he can use to track down the originator. Since the attacker
also participates in the protocol he could voluntarily break existing paths that pass through him in order to force the
users to recreate them.
If C is an anonymity system that models Crowds, then the m-paths version corresponds to the m-repetition of C,
which repeats the protocol m times without re-selecting a user. From Proposition 17 and since Crowds is not strongly
anonymous, we have that probable innocence cannot be satisﬁed if we allow an arbitrary number of paths. Intuitively
this is justiﬁed. Even if the attacker sees the event o1 meaning that user 1 was detected (was right before a corrupted
user in the path) it could be the case (with nontrivial probability) that user 2 was the real originator, he sent the message
to user 1 and he sent it to the attacker. However, if there are 10 paths and the attacker sees o1 . . . o1 (10 times) then it
is much more unprobable that all of the 10 times user 2 sent the message to user 1 and user 1 to the attacker. It appears
much more likely that user 1 was indeed the originator.
This attack had been foreseen in the original paper of Crowds and further analysis was presented in [24,21]. However,
our result is more general since we prove that probable innocence is impossible for any protocol that allows “multiple
paths”, in other words that can be modeled as an m-repetition, unless the original protocol is strongly anonymous.
Also our analysis is simpler since we did not need to calculate the actual probabilities of any observables in a speciﬁc
protocol.
6. Related work
Anonymity and privacy have been an area of research for over two decades now, with an increasing interest on the
subject during the last 5 years, resulting in a great number of publications. The most related work to ours, as we already
discussed in the Introduction and Section 3, is the one of Reiter and Rubin [15] and the one of Halpern and O’Neill
[10].
Apart from the above two, there aremany papers in the anonymity bibliography in which formal deﬁnitions of various
notions of anonymity are given. Schneider and Sidiropoulos [17] propose a deﬁnition of anonymity based on CSP.
Hughes and Shmatikov [12] developed a modular framework to formalize a range of properties (including numerous
ﬂavors of anonymity and privacy) using the notion of function views to represent a mathematical abstraction of partial
knowledge of a function. Syverson and Stubblebine [23] introduce the notion of group principals and an associated
epistemic logic to axiomatize anonymity. In these papers, possibilistic frameworks are used and it is not clear how the
deﬁnitions could be extended in a probabilistic setting.
On the other hand, Bhargava and Palamidessi [2] propose a probabilistic deﬁnition of strong anonymity using the
same framework as this paper. The resulting deﬁnition can be seen as the strong variant of Deﬁnition 8 (in fact, it implies
Deﬁnition 8 as shown in Section 4.1.3). Serjantov and Danezis [19] and Diaz et al. [6] take an information theoretical
approach by considering the entropy of the probability distribution that the attacker assigns to the anonymous agents
after observing the system.
Finally, we should mention an interesting work by Evﬁmievski et al. [8] on the ﬁeld of privacy preserving data
mining. Their deﬁnition requires that the probability of a private value x1 producing an output y should be at most 
times the corresponding probability of a different value x2. This is very close in spirit to our deﬁnition of probable
innocence.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered probable innocence, a weak notion of anonymity provided by real-world systems
such as Crowds. We have analyzed the deﬁnitions of probable innocence existing in literature, in particular: the one by
Reiter and Rubin which is suitable for systems which, like Crowds, satisfy certain symmetries, and the one given by
Halpern and O’Neill, which expresses a condition on the probability of the users.
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Our ﬁrst contribution is a deﬁnition of probable innocence which is (intuitively) adequate for a general class of
protocols, abstracts from the probabilities of the users and involves only the probabilities that depend solely on the
system. We have shown that the new deﬁnition is equivalent to the existing ones under symmetry conditions (Reiter
and Rubin) or uniform distribution of the users (Halpern and O’Neill).
A second contribution is the extension of the deﬁnition of probable innocence to the case of protocol repetition,
which is induced by multiple paths attacks. We have shown a general negative result, namely that no protocol can
ensure probable innocence under an arbitrary number of repetitions.
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